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FEDERAL YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT: THE CONTINUING
CHARADE
Wilfred J. Ritz*
No one will ever know, at least with any certainty,, whether more
harm than good has been done by the Federal Youth Corrections
Act.' The Act was enacted by Congress in 19502 upon the recommen-
dation of a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United
States.3 The youth offenders who have benefited under YCA are
those who have committed the most serious crimes, such as murder,
robbery, and rape,' and those with the longest records of serious
criminal conduct. Because of the YCA, some of these dangerous
offenders have received less severe sentences, and some have been
released on parole earlier than would have been the case under
regular adult sentencing.5
* Professor of Law and Director of the Alderson Legal Assistance Program, Washington
and Lee University; A.B., Washington and Lee University, 1938; LL.B., University of Rich-
mond, 1950; LL.M., Harvard University, 1951; S.J.D., 1961.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1976) (hereinafter referred to as YCA). All references and citations
hereinafter solely by section number are to Title 18, as amended. The title number will be
given only when the citation is to a Title other than 18.
2. Act of September 30, 1950, ch. 1115, 64 Stat. 1086 (1950).
3. At its October, 1940 session, the Judicial Conference resolved that the Chief Justice
appoint a Committee on Punishment of Crime. Chief Justice Stone appointed the Commit-
tee, with the Honorable John J. Parker named as Chairman. A Subcommittee on Treatment
of Youthful Offenders, with the Honorable Orie L. Phillips as Chairman, was thereafter
named. In 1942 the Committee filed a Report to the Judicial Conference of the Committee
on Punishment for Crime (1942), which contained both the report of the Subcommittee on
Treatment of Youthful Offenders and a draft of an act to carry out the Subcommittee's
recommendations.
Apparently, this report of the Committee on Punishment of Crime was not formally pre-
sented to the 1942 Judicial Conference for action. Instead, it was presented to Congress in
House and Senate Hearings held in 1943. No legislation was adopted, however, because of
objections made to a recommendation in the report for indeterminate sentences for adults.
Thereafter, the Conference several times reaffirmed the recommendations regarding youthful
offenders, and these recommendations, as approved by the Conference in September 1949,
were embodied in S. 2609, which became the YCA. [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 3983, 3984.
4. There are no YCA sentencing restrictions based on the nature of the offense. The § 3651
restriction against granting probation to a person convicted of an offense punishable by death
or life imprisonment can apparently be avoided by resort to granting probation under §
5010(a).
5. The "standard" regular adult sentence is the sentence under which the prisoner is
required to serve one-third of the sentence, or a maximum of ten years, before becoming
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The youth offenders who have been harmed the most by the YCA
are those who have committed only minor offenses, or who are first
offenders, i.e., the young offenders who were supposed to be bene-
fited by the YCA. Many of these minor offenders have been given
the Zip-6 sentence, as it is popularly known. Under this standard
YCA- confinement sentence imposed under § 5010(b), the offender
is eligible for parole at any time, and under § 5017(c) he must be
released on parole by the end of four years of confinement, and
under § 5017(d) he must be discharged unconditionally by the end
of six years.
The only other sentence authorized by the YCA that is less severe
eligible for parole. § 4205(a). Section 4205 also authorizes other similar sentences, distinguish-
able only because of different parole eligibility requirements. When sentence is imposed
under § 4205(b)(2), the prisoner becomes eligible for parole at any time. When the sentence
is under § 4205(b)(1), the prisoner is eligible for parole after serving s minimum term of
imprisonment that is less than one-third of the sentence.
For practical purposes, these statutory distinctions have been obliterated by the United
States Parole Commission. Parole guidelines require the prisoner to serve the same period of
confinement regardless of whether his parole eligibility is determined under subsection (a),
or under (b)(2), or (b)(1) of § 4205. 28 CFR § 2.20 (1978).
However, the Parole Commission does use a different set of Guidelines for YCA (and
NARA) offenders. The YCA and Adult Guidelines are the same for offenses of low severity,
as well as those for low moderate severity when the salient factor is very good, good, or fair.
Beginning with an offense of low moderate severity and poor salient factr, the guidelines are
more favorable to YCA than to adult offenders. The two different sets of guidelines require
adult offenders to serve from two months to two years longer in confinement than YCA
offenders must serve for the same offense. Id.
There are two other principal types of adult sentences* the split sentence and the NARA
sentence. Under a split sentence the defendant is confined for up to six months in a jail-type
institution and then placed on probation for up to five years. The prisoner does not come
under the jurisdiction of the Parole Commission. § 3651. A NARA sentence, imposable only
on eligible drug addicts, is for a minimum of six months and a maximum of ten years or the
maximum for the offense, whichever is the lesser. The prisoner is eligible for parole after six
months, but parole can only be granted by the Parole Commission after recommendation by
the Surgeon General. §§ 4251-55.
The only nonparolable long-term imprisonment sentence now authorized in the federal
system is for conviction of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise involving drugs. 21
U.S.C. § 848(c) (1976).
A sentence imposed under § 4205(c) is the maximum for the offense, but after receiving a
recommendation as to sentence from the Bureau of Prisons, the court either leaves the
sentence as a regular adult sentence, with parole eligibility under § 4205(a) or changes it to
any other type of sentence authorized for the offense. There are no sentences peculiar to
mental defectives, although there are statutes relating to their disposition §§ 4241-4248.
Juvenile delinquents, defined as persons under 18 who violate a law of the United States,
are handled under special provisions, and such disposition may be as an adult. §§ 5031-5042.
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than the Zip-6 is probation under § 5010(a). In granting probation
the court may use the confinement sentence authorized by the Split
Sentence provision of § 3651, under which the offender is sentenced
to serve up to six months in a jail-type institution, to be followed
by up to five years probation.7
While denying to YCA offenders the benefit of short adult con-
f'mement sentences, § 5010(c) of the YCA allows the imposition of
sentences as long as those for adults. Under a § 5010(c) sentence the
offender is still eligible for parole at any time, but under § 5017(d)
there is no requirement that parole be granted until he has served
all but two years of the sentence imposed. Under a regular adult
sentence the prisoner must be released on parole when he has served
two-thirds of the sentence, unless the Parole Commission deter-
mines that he has had bad institutional conduct or is likely to com-
mit a new offense.' Thus, except for the possibility of early release
by the Parole Commission, the YCA § 5010(c) sentence is less favor-
able than an adult sentence of the same length.
The sentiments that led the Judicial Conference of the United
States in 1942 to recommend adoption of the YCA were noble. Its
Subcommittee on Treatment of Youthful Offenders said of the pro-
posed act: "The underlying theory of the act is to substitute for
retributive punishment, methods of training and treatment de-
signed to correct and prevent criminal tendencies. The plan of the
act departs from the merely punitive idea of dealing with youthful
offenders and looks primarily to the objective idea of rehabilita-
tion."9 This theory was based on the subcommittee's findings that
"the period in life between 16 and 23 is a focal source of crime."' 0
6. While some judicial authority denies that probation is a "sentence," the better view is
that probation is a sentence. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND
PROCEDURES § 2.3 (1967); ABA STANDMAD RELATING TO PROBATION § 1.1 (1970).
7. The Bureau of Prisons considers the split sentence to be authorized under the YCA,
although it once expressed doubt as to whether such sentences were authorized in the Ninth
Circuit in light of the holding in United States v. Mollett, 510 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1975), which
held that a fine cannot be imposed in connection with a YCA sentence. However, Durst v.
United States, 434 U.S. 542 (1978) overrules Mollett on that point, and probably as regards
anything said about the split sentence as well.
8. § 4205(d).
9. COMMTTEE ON PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COM-
mIrEE ON PUNISHmENT FOR CRIME 35 (1942).
10. Id. at 31.
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"Sociologists and psychiatrists tell us that special causations, which
occur in the period between adolescence and manhood, produce
these antisocial conduct trends.""
"[R]eliable statistics demonstrate with reasonable certainty
that existing methods of treatment of criminally inclined youths are
not solving the problem.' 2 This philosophy accepted by the Judi-
cial Conference was in the air at the time, both as to the cause of
youthful crime and what to do about it.'3
House and Senate Committee reports show that Congress ac-
cepted this philosophy fully and agreed with it." And so, with lau-
datory motives and high aspirations, the YCA was enacted into law
in 1950.
There was a substantial delay in placing the YCA into operation
because of the statutory requirement prohibiting the commitment
of a youth offender under the Act to the Attorney General until the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons certified "that proper and ade-
quate treatment facilities and personnel" had been provided.'5 It
was not until January 19, 1954, that the Attorney General certified
that such facilities for a part of the country were available.,' But
once the courts were authorized to impose and did impose YCA
sentences, there was no delay in court challenges to the YCA. The
11. Id. at 32.
12. Id. at 33.
13. The Subcommittee acknowledged that it relied heavily upon a 1938 report of the
Delinquency Committee of the Boys Bureau of the Community Service Society in New York
and on an American Law Institute model act for establishing a youth correction authority.
Id. at 35. It also considered a supporting Report on Federal Youthful Offenders, prepared by
James V. Bennett, Director of the Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 41.
14. H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1950] U.S. CoDE CONG. Sav.
3983.
15. § 5012.
16. The certification was referred to in Memo No. 64 from the Deputy General and related
to district courts in the first seven circuits, except for Texas and Louisiana districts in the
Fifth Circuit. Inasmuch as the YCA is of national application and the Bureau of Prisons
operates a nationwide system of prisons, it is not evident why there were YCA facilities
available in seven circuits but not in the others. However this may be, amother memo dated
October 4, 1956, certified that YCA facilities were available for the Eighth, Ninth (except
for Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam) and Tenth Circuits and the districts of Texas and Louisiana.
See Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 758-59 (W.D. Wisc. 1977). Neither of these memos
certified that YCA facilities were available for the District of Columbia. For District of
Columbia problems see United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971).
[Vol. 13:743
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first major challenge of large precedential value was to a YCA sent-
ence imposed the day after the sentencing judge received notice that
he was authorized to impose such a sentence. 7
I. APPLICATION AND SENTENCING STRUCTURE OF YCA
A. General Application
The YCA expressly applies to the District of Columbia,"8 but it
has not been extended to the territories. 9 Under the Act, youth
offender means "a person under the age of twenty-two years 20 at the
time of conviction."' 2' Moreover, young adult offenders, defined as
persons twenty-two through twenty-five years of age, may also be
sentenced under the YCA.2
Unless the sentencing court finds that a youth offender "will not
derive benefit from treatment" under the Act, he must be sentenced
under the YCA.2' But the finding of "no benefit" does not constitute
a substantive standard and "need not be accompanied by a state-
ment of reasons." As regards young adult offenders, judicial au-
thority is seemingly unanimous that sentencing under the YCA may
be rejected without making any finding of "no benefit." 25
17. Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467, 469-70, n.2 (5th Cir. 1958). The certifica-
tion for Louisiana district courts was made under date of October 4, 1956. Supra note 16.
18. § 5025.
19. This discrepancy has survived equal protection and due process challenges. United
States v. Santiago, 576 F.2d 562 (3rd Cir. 1978).
20. See text infra beginning at note 26 for discussion regarding youth offenders who are
also juveniles.
21. § 5006(d). Conviction is defined in § 5006(g) as meaning "the judgment on a verdict
or finding of guilty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere." In spite of this seemingly
clear statutory language, the District of Columbia Circuit has said that "the time of
'conviction' is the time the verdict is returned or a plea of guilty is taken." United States v.
Branic, 495 F.2d 1066, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Fourth Circuit took the same view where a
jury verdict was involved. Jenkins v. United States, 555 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir. 1977).
22. § 4216.
23. § 5010(d).
24. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 441 (1974).
25. United States v. O'Neill, 573 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1978); Bustillo v. United States, 573
F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1978); Brown v. United States, 551 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1977); Mitchell
v. United States, 547 F.2d 875, 876 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Norton, 539 F.2d 1194,
1196 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cruz, 523 F.2d 473, 474-76 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Gamboa-Cano, 510 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1975); Roddy v. United States, 509 F.2d 1145, 1146-
47 (10th Cir. 1975).
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B. Juveniles
As regards juveniles, the application of the YCA in conjunction
with the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 2 presents a puzzle. A
juvenile is defined in the latter Act as "a person who has not at-
tained his eighteenth birthday" when he committed an act of juve-
nile delinquency, which is defined as an act "which would have been
a crime if committed by an adult. "2 The federal government's pre-
ferred way of handling juvenile delin uents is by surrendering them
to state authorities.21 But when this ts not done, the juvenile is to
be proceeded against under the FJDA unless: (a) he requests in
writing upon advice of counsel to be proceeded against as an adult;
or (b) he is sixteen years of age or over when he commits a felony
punishable by ten years imprisonment or more, in which case he
may be prosecuted criminally as an adult.2 1 In both of these instan-
ces, inasmuch as a juvenile is also by definition a youth offender, it
would seem that he would automatically come under the provisions
of the YCA.
The two situations in which the juvenile can be treated as an
adult, however, are very different, and so the statute should be
applied differently.
It is not apparent from the FJDA why a juvenile would want to
be treated as an adult. As a juvenile he cannot be committed for a
period extending beyond his twenty-first birthday, or if over nine-
teen, at time of disposition, for more than two years, and never for
a longer period than an adult could be sentenced.30 But for whatever
reason a juvenile might request to be treated as an adult, he ought
Even so, the Fourth Circuit takes the view that YCA sentencing cannot be denied to young
adult offenders solely on the basis of the nature of the crime committed. United States v.
Gallagher, 557 F.2d 1041, 1044 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ingrain, 530 F.2d 602 (4th
Cir. 1976). The Second Circuit has a rule that is very similar, saying that the sentencing judge
cannot put reliance on only one factor in a "fixed and mechanical way." United States v.
Negron, 548 F.2d 1085, 1086-87 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Torun, 37 F.2d 661, 663, n.4
(2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350, 1352 (2d Cir. L974). The same rule
is followed in the Sixth Circuit. United States v. Dinapoli, 519 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1975).
26. § 5031-5042. Hereinafter referred to as FJDA.
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not to be subjected to the harsher sentencing provisions of the YCA,
under which he can be sentenced for a term of imprisonment longer
than if he were an adult.
On the other hand, when the government proceeds against the
juvenile as an adult because of the seriousness of the crime, he ought
to be accorded the benefit of YCA sentencing, because by definition
it may be more lenient than the ten years to life penalty that makes
it possible to treat him as an adult in the first place.3 '
To make sense, then, YCA sentencing should be excluded when
the juvenile requests to be treated as an adult, but should be in-
cluded when the juvenile is being criminally prosecuted as an adult.
C. YCA Sentencing Structure
The YCA provides for three sentencing options under the Act and
authorizes, when the Act is not used, sentencing under other regular
sentencing provisions of the United States Code.
Under the Act the following types of sentences can be imposed:
1. Probation. Section 5010(a) authorizes probation, both by sus-
pending imposition of sentence and by suspending execution of
sentence. The provisions of the Probation Act, § 3651, are applicable
to YCA probation, so that YCA probation under § 5010(a) and
conditions of adult probation under § 3651, such as those relating
to imposition of fines or requiring restitution, can be used in connec-
tion with YCA probation. Upon revocation of probation imposed
under § 5010(a), the court is not limited to imposing another YCA
sentence, but instead may impose a regular adult sentence.32
Under the Split-Sentence provision of § 3651, a sentence of more
than six months may be imposed on the offender, with not more
than six-months confinement to be in a jail-type or treatment insti-
tution, to be followed by up to five years probation.
2. Zip-6 Sentence (the popular terminology). Under §§ 5010(b)
and 5017(c), the offender is sentenced to confinement for an indeter-
minate period, being eligible for parole at any time, entitled to
31. See text infra on Longer Sentences for Youths than for Adults, after footnote 42.
32. United States v. Evers, 534 F.2d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir. 1976).
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conditional release before the end of four years," and entitled to an
unconditional discharge by the end of six years.
3. Zip-Adult Term Sentence. Under §§ 5010(c) and 5017(d) the
sentence is the same as the Zip-6 except that it may be for any
period over six years up to the maximum imposable for the offense.
4. Adult Sentence. Under § 5010(d) the court is authorized, if of
the opinion that the offender will not derive benefit from the Zip-6
or Zip-Adult sentence, to sentence in accordance with any other
applicable penalty provisions. The result is that under § 5010(d) the
youth offender may be sentenced as an adult.
The Second Circuit held in United States v. Jackson34 that §
5010(d) does not provide an independent basis for imposing a YCA
sentence. It can be used only after a finding of no benefit has been
made, but when it is used, the benefits of the YCA sentence, such
as an opportunity to set aside the conviction, do not attach.35
The YCA sentence runs uninterruptedly from the date of convic-
tion,3" with conviction being defined in the Act as "the judgment on
a verdict or finding of guilty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo
contendere."37 Thus the YCA offender is entitled to credit against
33. It is only necessary to release the YCA offender once on parole. If parole is revoked he
may be re-imprisoned for the remainder of the six-year sentence. Coats v. United States, 405
F. Supp. 1107 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
34. 550 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977).
35. In Jackson the district court made an express finding that the youth offender would
benefit from treatment under the YCA and proceeded to impose a maximum one-year sent-
ence of confinement, under § 5010(d). The government was first denied correction of the
sentence, on the theory that it was illegal under Rule 35, and then sought and was granted a
writ of mandamus to direct resentencing. The Second Circuit had previously held, in United
States v. Cruz, 544 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976), that the sentencing court could not, under §
5010(b), impose a maximum confinement term of two years. It now held in Jackson that the
sentencing judge could not accomplish the same result by use of § 5010(d).
The Second Circuit took the opportunity to criticize the Parole Commission guidelines
being used for the parole of YCA offenders, as well as the anomaly that results from persons
given YCA sentences being treated more harshly than those with adult sentences. But the
remedy lies "either in administrative reform or Congressonal action." Id. at 832. However,
in light of Jackson's period of confinement, the court pointed out that the district judge could
carry out his original purpose by using § 5010(a) and granting the defendant probation under
YCA.
36. § 5017(d).
37. § 5006(g). In light of its holding in Jenkins v. United States, 555 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir.
1977), the Fourth Circuit has expressed some doubt about when the sentence starts running.
Davis v. Markley, 589 F.2d 784, 785, n.3 (4th Cir. 1979).
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the sentence for time spent on probation or parole, even though later
revoked. 8 The YCA offender is entitled to jail-time credit, in ac-
cordance with § 3568, against service of the sentence.39 Once judg-
ment has been entered on the conviction, the only grounds for inter-
rupting the running of the sentence and treating the time as inoper-
ative are periods of time during which the offender is in an escape
status,"0 under a stay of execution, as on appeal bond,4' or has been
committed for civil contempt.2
II. LONGER SENTENCES FOR YOUTHS THAN FOR ADULTS
The most persistent challenge to the YCA, at least until the cause
became hopeless in the face of solid judicial opposition, involved the
imposition of longer sentences on youths sentenced under the YCA
than are authorized for adults.
The first such challenge was made by the prisoner pro se in
Cunningham v. United States.1 Cunningham pleaded guilty on
October 16, 1956, to an information charging him with violation of
§ 661, the theft on a government reservation of a radio clock valued
at less than $100, so the offense was a misdemeanor carrying a
maximum penalty of 1 year. On October 24, he was given a Zip-6
sentence," the judge having received notice the day before of his
authority to impose a YCA sentence.
38. U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP'T Or JUSTICE, POLICY STATEMENT 7620.1, FEDERAL YOUTH
CoRRECnIoN Acr, p. 1 (9-5-72); 28 CFR § 2.52(d) (1978).
39. United States v. Hamilton, 300 F. Supp. 728 (E.D.N.C. 1969).
40. Suggs v. Daggett, 522 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1975); Hartwell v. Jackson, 403 F. Supp. 1229
(D.D.C. 1975); 28 CFR § 2.10(c)(2) (1978).
41. Frye v. Moran, 302 F. Supp. 1291, 1294 (W.D. Tex.), affl'd, 417 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1969);
28 CFR § 2.10(c)(2) (1978). However, a youth offender whose probation is revoked and sent-
ence of confinement is stayed is entitled to sentence credit during the stay of the confinement
sentence. Davis v. Mirkley, 589 F.2d 784, 785, n.3 (4th Cir. 1979).
42. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Marshall), 532 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1976).
43. 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958). The court said it was cited to no federal case and it had
found none involving the federal YCA or otherwise dealing with the precise questions pre-
sented. Id. at 472.
44. The court explained its reasoning in imposing the sentence as follows:
Mr. Cunningham, you have been in some trouble before, but not too serious. Appar-
ently, the principal trouble with you is that you have been considerably mixed up as
to the attitude you ought to have toward life. I think you also are in need of psychiatric
treatment. I hope you will take advantage of the treatment afforded you.
Id. at 469-70, n.2.
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After completing service of one year in prison, Cunningham chal-
lenged the YCA sentence45 on the ground that the YCA did not
apply to misdemeanors and that the imposition of more severe sent-
ences on youth offenders than on adults was a cruel and unusual
punishment, or, by implication, a denial of equal protection. His
claims were rejected, primarily on the basis of state cases embody-
ing the then prevalent "treatment" theory.46
In 1962, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia consid-
ered the same question in Carter v. United States.4 Carter, aged
twenty, was charged in a four-count indictment with housebreaking
and grand larceny. On June 19, 1961, he withdrew his plea of not
guilty and pleaded guilty to two counts of petty larceny, a misde-
meanor carrying a maximum sentence of one year. At sentencing,
Carter protested the imposition of a Zip-6 sentence, preferring in-
stead to serve the "conventional one year misdemeanor sentence at
Occoquan prison."4 He appealed in forma pauperis.
In an opinion by Circuit Judge Burger, now Chief Justice, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals accepted as correct the
Cunningham interpretation of the YCA under which a Zip-6 sent-
ence can "constitutionally and legally be imposed for a misde-
meanor carrying a one year penalty."49 Referring to the statute, the
court said:
This language is silent with respect to limiting the number of years
under the Act to the term ordinarily ordered for the particular crime
in question. Actual confinement under the Youth Corrections Act
may be greater or may be less depending on many facts we cannot
know or anticipate. But the basic theory of that Act is rehabilitative
and in a sense this rehabilitation may be regarded as comprising the
45. He sought relief under both FED. R. Civ. P. 35 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
46. There was a dissent on the ground that the YCA, although constitutional, was being
unconstitutionally applied because, before pleading guilty and even before sentencing, Cun-
ningham had not been informed of the sentence imposable under YCA, and he had neither
assented to the sentence nor waived his right to counsel when pleading guilty to an offense
that could result in a sentence of the length of the Zip-6. Id. at 473-74
47. 306 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
48. Id. at 285. The opinion is not clear as to whether Carter expected under a regular
sentence to serve only one year under two concurrent sentences, or whether he was prepared
to serve two years under two consecutive sentences of one year each.
49. Id.
[Vol. 13:743
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quid pro quo for a longer confinement but under different conditions
and terms than a defendant would undergo in an ordinary prison.6
In further support of the quid pro quo argument the court, quoting
from Cunningham, said that the YCA provides "not heavier penal-
ties and punishment than are imposed upon adult offenders, but the
opportunity to escape from the physical and psychological shocks
and traumas attendant upon serving an ordinary penal sentence
while obtaining the benefits of corrective treatment, looking to reha-
bilitation and social redemption and restoration."'-
Carter was in a much different position than Cunningham.
Whereas Cunningham was never charged with anything more than
a misdemeanor, Carter not only was charged with felonies, but prob-
ably could have been convicted. Even in pleading guilty to petty
larceny, Carter admitted "I broke-into the house. ... "52 The max-
imum penalties for the offenses with which Carter was charged were
as much as fifteen years.53 Insofar as Carter was concerned, the YCA
Zip-6 sentence was more severe only as regards the offense to which
he pleaded guilty, and not as compared with the penalty imposable
for the offense of which he probably could have been convicted. On
the other hand, Cunningham was relatively an "innocent."
Thus, in these two early cases the YCA was interpreted as permit-
ting harsher sentencing for the relatively minor youth offender than
for an adult, while at the same time dealing more leniently with the
more serious youthful offender than if he were an adult.
The imposition of the more severe YCA sentence has even been
upheld where the defendant had already been held in confinement
a length of time so that, if an adult, he would walk out of court a
free person. In United States v. Lewis54 the defendant was tried on
two counts of second-degree burglary, an offense carrying a penalty
50. Id.
51. Id. While sustaining this type of YCA sentence the court did vacate and remand to
permit the defendant to move to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he had not been
fully informed of the consequences of the plea.
52. Id. at 284, n.1.
53. Housebreaking is punishable by a sentence of two to fifteen years. D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
§ 22-1801(b) (West, 1967). Grand larceny is punishable by a sentence of one to ten years. D.C.
CODE ENCYCL. § 22-2201 (West 1967).
54. 447 F.2d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:743
of two to fifteen years. He was found guilty of the lesser-included
offense of unlawful entry, a misdemeanor punishable by a maxi-
mum jail term of six months. By the time of sentencing Lewis had
already been in jail seven months, and so he argued that he had
already completed an adult sentence and could not be sentenced
under the YCA. The Court of Appeals responded that the YCA
sentence could be imposed, using as the reason the flimsy ground
that under § 3568 only the Attorney General can "later" allow jail
time, and so at the time of sentencing the court could not recognize
a jail-time credit." It appears obvious that Lewis was given the
longer YCA sentence as punishment for the offenses of which he had
not been convicted and for his other troubles with the law. 6 How-
ever, the imposition of the longer YCA sentence simply because the
sentencing judge thinks the. maximum for the offense is
"insufficient punishment" was held improper by the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Hartford.57
Other youthful offenders challenging their longer YCA sentences
have been met with a solid phalanx of judicial opinion so concerned
for their benefit that the longer sentences have been uniformly up-
held. "
55. Presumably the same rule should apply to adults, but if so the adult would be required
to spend in confinement more time than the maximum allowable for the offense.
56. Originally released on bond, he had been arrested on other charges. Even though these
new charges were dismissed and he was released on bond again, this bond was revoked before
he was brought to trial. 447 F.2d at 1264, n.3.
57. 489 F.2d 652, 654-55 (5th Cir. 1974). The court remanded for resentencing under the
regular penalty provision.
58. Misdemeanor Offenses: Guidry v. United States, 433 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1970) (1 year
maximum under 26 U.S.C. § 5674); Brisco v. United States, 368 F.2d 2 L4 (3d Cir. 1966) (6
months maximum under § 1701); Eller v. United States, 327 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1964) (1 year
maximum under § 752).
Felonies: McGann v. United States, 440 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1971) (5 years maximum under
the Dyer Act, § 2312); Satchfield v. United States, 450 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1970) (Dyer Act);
Cladwell v. United States, 435 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1970) (Dyer Act); Abernathy v. United
States, 418 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1969) (Dyer Act); United States v. Rehfield, 416 F.2d 273 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 996 (1970) (5 years maximum for Selective Service offense,
50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b)); United States v. Dancis, 406 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1969) (5 years
maximum for Selective Service offense, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b)); Foston v. United States,
389 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 940 (1968) (5 years maximum for mail theft,
§ 1708); Johnson v. United States, 374 F.2d 966 (4th Cir. 1967) (Dyer Act); Kotz v. United
States, 353 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1965) (Dyer Act); Rogers v. United Stateo, 326 F.2d 56 (10th
Cir. 1963) (3 years maximum under § 1072); United States v. Vaught, 355 F. Supp. 1348
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YCA confinement sentences imposed under § 5010(b) for a period
of less than six years have been held to be illegal." As such, they
are subject to correction at any time by increasing the sentence to
six years, without violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 0
The Bureau of Prisons has made no official statement of the ac-
tion it will take when it receives a YCA commitment under §
5010(b) for a period of less than six years. There are several possibil-
ities. It may notify the appropriate United States Attorney so that,
so advised, he may seek to have the sentence corrected. Absent such
correction, on motion of the United States Attorney, or perhaps the
court's own motion, the Bureau has two alternatives: either com-
pute the sentence with the shorter confinement term, or compute
the sentence as though a Zip-6 sentence had been formally imposed.
Bureau action will probably depend upon the exact language of the
sentence and the whole factual picture.
The problem is graphically illustrated by United States v. Cruz."'
Cruz was an alien convicted of an offense carrying a maximum
(W.D. Mo. 1972) (2 years maximum under 1202(a)(1)).
Contempt: United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932
(1971) (§ 5010(e) commitment for observation).
59. There is one judicially recognized exception, where the sentence is imposed for an
Assimilative Crimes Act offense. See text after footnote 65 infra.
The split sentence under which a confinement term of up to six months in a jail-type
institution can be imposed is based on the Probation Act § 5010(a), incorporating § 3651.
60. Bums v. United States, 552 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1977) (three-year YCA sentence cor-
rected by court on its own motion under FED. R. Cirv. P. 35); United States v. Cruz, 544 F.2d
1162 (2d Cir. 1976) (Bureau of Prisons computed two-year YCA sentence as though it were
Zip-6).
United States v. Marron, 564 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1977), involved a YCA sentence that is
unusually mixed up. The twenty-year old youth pleaded quilty to a single charge of forgery,
in violation of § 495, which carries a maximum penalty of ten years. The court, on April 2,
1976, found that he would benefit from YCA treatment and proceeded to sentence him under
§§ 3651 and 5010(b) lo a term of three years on condition that he spend a period of thirty
days, consisting of 48-hour weekends, in a jail-type institution, with the rest of the confine-
ment suspended and placed on probation for the balance of the term. On March 3, 1977,
probation was revoked on account of a violation of state law committed on February 3, and
a Zip-6 sentence was imposed.
A majority of the court upheld the sentence, holding the original sentence was illegal and
the court had a right to resentence, regardless of the legality of the probation revocation. A
dissenting judge took a more realistic view of the YCA and would have held the increase of
sentence from three to six years to be invalid. For further discussion see text infra after note
151.
61. 544 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976).
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penalty of five years. 2 The district court apparently thought that a
two-year confinement sentence was appropriate, but also wanted to
give Cruz the benefit of the YCA provision authorizing the setting
aside of the conviction in order that Cruz might be able to avoid
deportation. 3 Accordingly, a two-year YCA sentence was imposed
under 5010(b).
However, under parole guidelines used by the Parole Commission,
Cruz would not be released on parole until after service of 21
months. The result would have been, if the Parole Commission ad-
hered to its guidelines and other rules, a virtual impossibility for
Cruz to obtain an unconditional discharge within the two-year term
of the sentence so as to have his conviction set aside. In this situa-
tion, the Bureau computed the sentence as though it were a regular
Zip-6, and the Parole Commission notified Cruz he would have to
serve 21 months. Cruz thereupon sought a reduction of sentence,
which was denied. On appeal the original sentence of two years was
found to be illegal, and the case was remanded for resentencing.
On remand, the district court could have reimposed a Zip-6 sent-
ence giving Cruz the benefit of the YCA setting aside of the convic-
tion provision; or it could have given him an adult sentence of two
years, shortening the potential period of confinement to a little more
than nineteen months, 4 but denying to him the benefit of the YCA
provision. Inasmuch as Cruz had by the time of the re-sentencing
served a substantial amount of time, the purpose sought in the
original sentence could best be obtained by using § 5010(a) to grant
probation and then use § 5021(b) to grant an unconditional dis-
charge. This is what the sentencing judge did.65
62. §§ 371, 659, conspiracy to steal goods from an interstate shipment.
63. See text after note 76, infra.
64. Under this sentence, Cruz would have received six days of good time per month and
so have been entitled to mandatory release after service of one year, seven months and six
days. §§ 4161, 4163.
65. The Docket Sheets kindly supplied by the Clerk show that the district court resen-
tenced Cruz on November 24, 1976, using § 5010(a) to impose a two-year sentence of confine-
ment, which was suspended, and the defendant was placed on probation for two years.
On September 7, 1978, the court unconditionally discharged Cruz from probation and
issued him a certificate vacating his conviction. This was in accord with the literal language
of § 5021(b), which authorizes the court to take this action "prior to the expiration of the
maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by the court." It does seem probable, though,
that the statute was drafted with a view to the court placing the defendant on probation at
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The only situation in which a confinement sentence of less than
six years has been allowed under § 5010(b) has involved application
of the YCA in conjunction with the Assimilative Crimes Act.6 In
United States v. Dunn,"7 the youth offender was convicted of a mis-
demeanor, which under Colorado law carried a maximum penalty
of one year. The Tenth Circuit held it to be error to impose a YCA
Zip-6 sentence and said that a YCA sentence of one year would
harmonize and give effect to both of the applicable statutes. The
court did not make clear how effect could be given to the YCA
provisions relating to conditional release, unconditional discharge,
and to the setting aside of the conviction."
The final decision of the court'of appeals was delayed three
months by an unsuccessful effort by the government to obtain a
rehearing." As a result, Dunn did not come up for resentencing until
he had already served 494 days in custody. And so, on motion, he
was granted an outright discharge from custody, no effort appar-
ently being made to obtain an unconditional discharge and certifi-
cate vacating the conviction. 0
The potential imposition of a YCA sentence longer than that
imposable on an adult has collateral consequences: 1) the defendant
must be advised of the length of the potential YCA sentence before
his plea of guilty to the offenses can be accepted;" 2) the prosecution
of misdemeanors must be by indictment;72 3) the petty offender may
the time of the original sentencing, rather than on a resentencing as in Cruz. If the Cruz
sentence was computed as running from the date of conviction, that is, when the original
sentence was imposed on February 11, 1976, the sentence had expired prior to the granting
of the unconditional discharge and so the discharge was unauthorized.
66. The Assimilative Crimes Act provides that the federal offender "shall be guilty of a
like offense and subject to a like punishment" as is provided by the laws of the state where
the offense is committed. § 13.
67. 545 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1976).
68. §§ 5017, 5021.
69. The case was decided on December 20, 1976; rehearing was denied March 21, 1977.
Note 67, sdpra.
70. This information is shown by the Docket Sheets, copies of which have been kindly
supplied by the Clerk.
71. Chapin v. United States, 341 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1965); Workman v. United States,
337 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1964); Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963); Carter
v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
72. United States v. Neve, 357 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Wis. 1973), affl'd, 492 F.2d 465 (7th Cir.
1974); United States v. Reef, 268 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Colo. 1967). Contra, Harvin v. United
19791
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be entitled to trial by jury;7 and 4) after conviction of a drug offense,
a special parole term cannot be added to a YCA sentence.74
II. THE OVERRATED "EXPUNGEMENT" OF THE YCA. CONVICTION
A YCA conviction under § 5021(a) is automatically set aside if the
Parole Commission unconditionally discharges the offender from
parole bfore expiration of the maximum sentence, which for the
Zip-6 would be before the end of six years; the offender is automati-
cally entitled to a "certificate to that effect. ' 75 The opportunity
afforded to the YCA offender to have the conviction set aside is a
benefit of the YCA sentence that is frequently referred to by the
courts-but always in dictum. 78
There are rare situations in which the provisions of § 5021 are of
real and substantial benefit to a YCA offender, as when an alien is
convicted of a drug offense, or a person is charged with a firearms
offense. Morera v. United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service7 recognized the setting aside of the conviction of a YCA
offender under § 5021 as eliminating the "conviction" that other-
wise would have resulted in virtually automatic deportation.7 8 Pos-
session by a felon of a firearm is a federal felony.79 Two circuits have
held that a YCA offender whose conviction has been set aside is not
States, 445 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971).
For the confusion in the Ninth Circuit see United States v. Ramirez, 5156 F.2d 909 (9th Cir.
1976), in which the original opinion was withdrawn upon rehearing after the record was
augmented. See also United States v. Stimpson, 549 F.2d 1286 (9th Ci. 1977); and United
States v. Leming, 532 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976).
73. United States v. Davis, 430 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Hawaii 1977). The offense carried a
maximum sentence of a fine of $500 and six months imprisonment.
74. United States v. Myers, 543 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1976).
75. When a youth offender is placed on probation under § 5010(a), the sentencing court at
any time before expiration of probation may grant the offender an unconditional discharge
from probation, which automatically sets aside the conviction and entitles the offender to a
certificate to that effect.
76. Kutcher, Looking at the Law, 42 FED. PROBATION 60, 60, n.6 (September 1978) collects
cases ascribing to § 5021 a curative effect-but doing so only in dictum.
77. 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972).
78. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1976) an alien who has a single conviction under any
law relating to illicit possession or traffic in narcotic drugs or marijuana is to be deported.
The YCA expungement provision could also be useful where deportation under 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a) (1976) is based on convictions for other offenses.
79. 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) (1976).
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a "felon" so as to commit a federal offense by possessing a firearm.""
It would be an extraordinary perversion of the original purposes of
the YCA if the "no prior felony conviction" theory of these cases
should be extended to the recidivist, so that the two-time offender,
whose first conviction has been set aside, cannot be convicted as a
second offender.
• Beyond this, though, the value of the YCA expungement to a YCA
offender seeking a new start in the community is problematic.8' The
judicial authority is unanimous that § 5021 does not require, nor in
and of itself even authorizes, expungement of the conviction, in the
sense of physically expunging or sealing the records.2 The YCA does
not prevent the facts of the conviction being used in a credit report,
with resulting consequences prejudicial to the YCA offender. 3 A
YCA offender who answers "no" to the question of whether he has
ever been convicted of a crime treads on treacherous ground. It may
be he can "lawfully" give this answer in the sense that he cannot
be convicted of a crime for doing so," but the applicant for the bar,
or similar examination, may find to his sorrow that the propounder
of the question expects the literal truth. 5
80. United States v. Purgason, 565 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Fryer, 545
F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1976). And accordingly, such a YCA offender, by denying the felony convic-
tion, does not make a misrepresentation in violation of § 922(a)(6). Id.
81. See Kutcher, Looking at the Law, 42 FED. PROBATION 60 (September, 1978); Saperstein,
Expungement for Youth Offenders, CASE AN CoMMENT 3, (January-February, 1978); Schaef-
fer, The Federal Youth Corrections Act: The Purposes and Uses of Vacating the Conviction,
39 FED. PROBATION 31 (September, 1975).
The extent to which YCA convictions that have been set aside may be used for impeach-
ment purposes under FED. R. Evim. 609(d) has not been resolved. See United States v. Trejo-
Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1978).
82. United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d
387 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hall, 452 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States
v. Heller, 435 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ohio 1976); United States v. Glasgow, 389 F. Supp. 217
(D.D.C. 1975).
There is authority that there is inherent equitable authority, aside from the YCA, to
expunge criminal justice records. United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d at 393; United States v.
Glasgow,.389 F. Supp. at 224, n.17; United States v. Hall, 452 F. Supp. at 1013; Menard v.
Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
83. Fite v. Retail Credit Co., 386 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Mont. 1975), affld, 537 F.2d 384 (9th
Cir. 1976). The YCA offender lost his job when his employer learned of the theft conviction
that led to the YCA sentence.
84. Kutcher, supra, note 81 at 61 expresses this view in reliance on United States v. Fryer,
supra, note 80.
85. Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 844, providing for expunging a conviction record for a first offense of
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IV. DIFFERENT CRITERIA FOR PAROLE THAN FOR COMMITMENT
Although the YCA sentence was intended to be rehabilitative
only, and not punitive, the United States Board of Parole never so
treated it. The parole release criteria used by the Youth Corrections
Division in considering YCA offenders was always the same as the
Board used generally. The circumstances of the offense, prior crimi-
nal record, and institutional experience were all considered relevant
factors, but it was not until publication of Parole Guidelines in the
fall of 1973 that this became evident for all to see.8"
In the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, 8 Con-
gress changed the criteria for granting parole to YCA offenders, but
without changing the basis for commitments under the YCA. The
1976 Parole Act abolished the special Youth Correction Division,
and made the criteria for parole of YCA offenders the same as the
criteria for adults," while also giving legislative sanction to Parole
Commission use of guidelines,89 which explicitly adopted severity of
the offense as one factor."
In considering whether the 1976 Parole Act could be applied retro-
actively to a YCA offender, the Second Circuit in Shepard v.
Taylor9 said: "The instant controversy arises out of the recent tend-
ency to reject the so-called 'rehabilitative ideal' as a relic of an
earlier, more optimistic, era and to return to traditional criteria of
retribution and deterrence in punishing juvenile offenders. ' 9 2 To
simple possession of drugs, and authorizing the offender thereafter to answer any inquiry
regarding the matter in the negative without being liable "under any provision of any law to
be guilty of perjury or otherwise giving a false statement."
86. E.g., U.S. BOARD OF PAROLE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RULES OF TE UNITEz STATES BOARD OF
PAROLE, Effective January 1, 1971, 57 with cross-reference to 14-16 (1971). While the Rules,
Effective January 1, 1965, are not quite so explicit, they still called for a consideration of "all
the available facts" and analogized the treatment of YCA offenders to adults committed
under § 4208(a)(2). U.S. BOARD OF PAROLE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RULES OF THE UNITED STATES
BoARD OF PAROLE, Effective July 1, 1965 (1965).
Guidelines were first published in 38 Fed. Reg. 31, 942 (1973).
87. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (1976)
(hereinafter Parole Act of 1976). Effective date of the Act was May 14, 1976. Principal
provisions of the Act are now codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
88. This was done by amending §§ 5005 and 5017(a).
89. § 4203(a)(1).
90. § 4206(a).
91. 556 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1977).
92. Id. at 650. The opinion was delivered by Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman. Mr. Justice
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now use the same criteria, the Second Circuit said, to determine
parole release for a YCA offender, who was sentenced to treatment
as is used for the hardened adult criminal constitutes a "midstream
increase in punishment" that violates the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. 3
V. THE INEXPLICABLE VAGARIES OF THE YCA SENTENCE
There are inexplicable vagaries in the YCA sentence, when com-
pared with an adult sentence, even of the same length. Except with
the benefit of hindsight and with reference to the facts of specific
cases, it is impossible to say which is the more favorable, or lenient,
sentence.
The sentence imposed under § 4205(b)(2) is the most favorable
regular adult sentence insofar as the statutory terms are concerned.
The Zip-6 sentence imposed under § 5010(b) is the most favorable
YCA confinement sentence. Offenders serving either sentence are
eligible for release at any time . 4 Both must be released by the end
of four years. If parole is violated the YCA offender is entitled to
credit against the sentence for time on parole,96 but the adult has a
right to such time only if the violation is not for a new crime or is
not for a refusal to obey commission orders."
The parole guidelines used by the United States Parole Commis-
sion are all at least as favorable, and generally more favorable, to
Tom Clark was a member of the panel.
93. Id. Some differences of opinion had been developing as to the appropriate criteria
governing parole release of YCA offenders. A district court in Pennsylvania held that the use
by the Parole Commission of guidelines, incorporating offense severity as a factor, violated
the purposes of the YCA and so was illegal. Mayet v. Sigler, 403 F. Supp. 1243 (M.D. Pa.
1975). The Tenth Circuit, quite offhandedly, disagreed and sustained the use of such guide-
lines. Fronczak v. Warden, 553 F.2d 1219 (10th Cir. 1977). To the same effect is Robinson v.
Hanberry, 442 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
The Shepard view that the 1976 Act cannot be applied retroactively to a YCA offender has
been followed in DePeralta v. Garrison, 575 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1978); Duldulao v. United
States Parole Commission, 461 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
94. Cf. § 5017(a) and § 4205(b)(2).
95. Cf. § 5017(c) and § 4206(d), although there is a proviso on the latter.
96. Similarly the YCA offender is entitled to credit against a confinement sentence for time
spent on probation.
97. Cf. § 5017(c) and § 4210(b) and (c).
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the YCA than to the adult offender,98 even the adult serving a §
4205(b)(2) sentence, inasmuch as the Parole Commission treats the
(b)(2) sentence the same as other regular adult sentences.5' There
is no YCA advantage for offenses whose severity is rated low, nor
for low moderate severity offenses with better than a "poor" salient
factor. But beginning with the low moderate offense and a poor
salient factor, the YCA offender is required to serve terms of con-
finement that are shorter than adults are required to serve by three
to thirty months. The discrepancy increases directly with the sever-
ity of the offense.
The maximum term that a YCA offender can be required to serve
is greater than the term that can be required of an adult. This is
because the YCA offender is denied the good time to which an adult
is entitled under present Bureau of Prisons policy.Y' The meager
case authority tends to support the Bureau, but it is to be noted that
the three principal cases considering the issue were pro se and were
also coupled with a challenge to the length of the YCA sentences
because they exceeded those imposable on adults."0 ' The reason
given for denying good time credit on the YCA sentence is that the
sentence is not for a definite term, as required by the good time
statute, § 4161.102 But the District Court in Foote v. United States 03
took the trouble to compare the YCA and the (b) (2) Sentence, to
which good time does apply, and found they were both for a
"definite term." But Foote nevertheless denied good time on the
ground that the YCA is an integrated law and because it was
thought the YCA prohibition against "commutation of sentence" is
intended to exclude good time.'0 ' In light of the changes made by
the Parole Act of 1976 in both the YCA and regular adult sentences,
98. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). The distinctions are continued in the proposed revised guide-
lines. 43 Fed. Reg. 46, 859-67 (1978).
99. Id.
100. U.S. BuRFwu OF PRSONs, DEP'T OF JusTcE, PoLcy STATE T 7620.1: FEDERAL YOUTH
CORRECTIONs Acr (1972). For the statutes governing adult good time, see §§ 4161-66.
101. Staudmier v. United States, 496 F.2d 1191 (10th Cir. 1974); Hale v. United States,
307 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Okla. 1970); Foote v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 627 (D. Nev. 1969).
102. Staudmier v. United States, 496 F.2d at 1192; Hale v. United States, 307 F. Supp. at
346.
103. Foote v. United States, 306 F. Supp. at 628.
104. Id. The court simply ignored the part of the section providing that commutation
should be "only in accordance with rules prescribed . . ." § 5017.
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particularly in narrowing the differences between the YCA and the
(b)(2) sentences, it can be persuasively argued that, whatever the
law may have been, since adoption of the 1976 Parole Act, YCA
offenders are entitled to good time credit against computation of
their maximum terms, although not against their conditional re-
lease dates. 05
VI. Tm BENEFrr-No BENEFrr SHELL GAME
"Unless the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive
benefit from treatment," a YCA sentence rather than an adult sent-
ence must be imposed. In this indirect way, the YCA, in § 5010(d),
created the "no benefit" rule for persons under the age of 22 that
has been the YCA's most fruitful source of litigation-at least until
the United States Supreme Court undertook to settle the rule in
1974 in Dorszynski v. United States.' The "no benefit" rule does
not apply when the youth offender is placed on probation or given
a split sentence. With a finding of "no benefit" the court may im-
pose any other authorized adult sentence. 10
The "no benefit" rule has not been extended to young adults,
those twenty-two through twenty-five, who are eligible under § 4216
to be sentenced under the YCA.05
Before the Supreme Court decision in Dorszynski the circuits had
split in the application of the "no benefit" rule. Some required the
105. Statutory good time under § 4161 is computed on the basis of the length of the
aggregate of the sentences being served. Initially, the defendant will be credited with the full
amount of statutory good time that can be earned, but later, to the extent that it has been
earned, the good time can be forfeited under § 4165, although forfeited good time can also be
restored under § 4166. Extra good time can be earied under § 4162 for employment in prison
industries or for other meritorious service.
Good time has no effect on the parole eligibility date. But when a prisoner has been paroled
and returned to confinement for a parole violation, all good time earned to that date is in
effect forfeited, because a new computation is made of the good time that can be earned on
the length of the sentence still to be served, although using the "rate" for the overall sentence.
106. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
107. § 5010(d) only refers to sentences imposed under § 5010(b) and (c), and does not refer
to probation sentences under § 5010(a).
108. Farries v. United States, 570 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Barton, 566 F.2d
1106 (9th Cir. 1977); Mitchell v. United States, 547 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1977); Brown v. United
States, 547 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Noland, 510 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1974).
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district court to make an explicit finding, supported by reasons on
the record, that the offender would not benefit from a YCA sen-
tence. Other circuits held that the "no benefit" finding could be
implied from the record." 9 The Court resolved the conflict by laying
down the following rule: "[W]hile an express finding of no benefit
must be made on the record, the Act does not require that it be
accompanied by supporting reasons.""' 0
Under the philosophy motivating adoption of the YCA, the
"benefit-no benefit" finding undoubtedly was intended to be an
honest and realistic evaluation of the offender's potential for reha-
bilitation. But there were inherent fallacies in the YCA philosophy,
the principal one being the unproven notion that there is something
peculiar about youthful age, per se, that makes it possible for the
sentencing judge to predict more easily and more accurately than
in the case of adults, which persons can or cannot be rehabilitated.
The result is that the YCA does not in fact segregate impressionable
first offenders from sophisticated young criminals, whose criminal
records are limited only by opportunity and not by disposition. The
youthful "lamb" is confined with the youthful "wolf," whose preda-
tory disposition is perhaps enhanced rather than diminished by his
youth. Moreover, Congress in 1950 was unable to spell out what kind
of treatment benefits a youth sentenced under the YCA that is not
of equal benefit for a youth sentenced as an adult. It has been
simply impossible to develop in the real world the special forms of
"treatment" mandated by the YCA in the abstract.
The "benefit-no benefit" finding has become a shell game. The
"no benefit" finding may conceal a true "no benefit" finding made
with reference to a truly hardened young offender who it is thought
should be sentenced as an adult, or it may be made with reference
to the minor misdemeanant in order that he may be given a brief
period of confinement, but not the onerous Zip-6 sentence. On the
other hand, the "benefit" finding may be one made with a view to
giving the young offender a better break than he would receive if
sentenced as an adult, or it may be a finding that means nothing
more than that even the perpetrator of a heinous crime is not hope-
109. 418 U.S. at 425 n.1.
110. Id. at 425-26.
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less and is entitled to something in the nature of a second chance.
And so the "benefit-no benefit" finding may be a realistic finding
or it may be nothing more than a sham.
VII. YCA IN THE SuPREME COURT: Dorszynski AND Durst
The United States Supreme Court has now interpreted the YCA
in two cases, the first not being decided until a quarter-century had
elapsed after the YCA was enacted: United States v. Dorszynski,"'
and Durst v. United States,112 decided four years later.
Both cases clearly reflect the fallacious philosophy of the YCA. In
order to show this, the following discussion of the two cases will
undertake to show the full factual picture bts completely as possible,
without being limited to the rarefied legal questions presented to the
Supreme Court.
A. Dorszynski v. United States113
Dorszynski pleaded guilty on February 14, 1972, to the unlawful
possession of LSD in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. A split sentence was imposed, under which he was to serve
ninety days in a jail-type institution, and then to be placed on
probation for two years."'
While serving this ninety-day confinement sentence, Dorszynski
filed a motion pursuant to § 2255 and Rule 35 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. He claimed that his privilege against incrimina-
tion had been violated; that he had not been advised before accept-
ance of his plea of guilty of the potentiar six-year sentence under the
YCA; that the court had made no finding that he would not benefit
from a YCA sentence; and that his plea of guilty was involuntary
in that it was based on a promise by a DEA agent that if he cooper-
ated with federal authorities and pleaded guilty he would receive
probation under § 5010(a). It may be inferred from these claims that
111. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
112. 434 U.S. 542 (1978).
113. United States v. Dorszynski, 484 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973); cert. granted, 414 U.S. 1091
(1973); reversed, Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); proceedings on remand,
United States v. Dorszynski, 524 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1975).
114. 484 F.2d at 850.
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Dorszynski felt aggrieved because he had received a ninety-day jail
sentence instead of probation."V
By the time a hearing was held on June 2, 1972, on his motions,
Dorszynski had been released from confinement on his ninety-day
sentence."' At the hearing, the DEA agent denied making the al-
leged promise. Dorszynski denied that there was any inconsistency
between his answers given to the court's questions at the time the
plea of guilty was entered and his claim regarding the DEA agent's
promise. 17
The judge took a different view. He thought the record showed
that Dorszynski must have misrepresented matters either at the
plea hearing or at this later hearing, and concluded that Dorszynski
had "lied outrageously." He not only denied all motions, but went
further, revoking probation and commiting Dorszynski to custody.
The court was particularly offended at the defendant's claim that
the DEA agent had told him he would ask the court to give Dorszyn-
ski probation, and at the plea hearing Dorszynski admitted that he
had "hoped" that this had been done. Defense counsel was
"outraged" at the action of the court in revoking probation.,"
Dorszynski appealed. The trial court denied bail pending appeal
but the Seventh Circuit on June 5 ordered his release on bail pend-
ing appeal."'
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
various motions made by Dorszynski, but held that his probation
should not have been revoked. Only a conviction of perjury, the
Seventh Circuit said, can suffice to constitute a violation of law that
violates the conditions of probation and justifies probation revoca-
115. Id. There is no indication in these claims whether the failure to be given an opportun-
ity under the YCA to have his conviction set aside under § 5021(a) was a substantial griev-
ance.
116. Dorszynski was tried and sentenced on February 14, 1972, and immediately commit-
ted to jail. Brief for Petitioner, Appendix, 418 U.S. 424; Proceedings upon Filing Information,
Arraignment, Plea and Sentence, pp. 6-14. He was released from phy:3ical confinement on
May 11, 1972. Id. at 53.
117. Transcript of Hearing, June 2, 1972, Id. at 25-28.
118. Id. at pp. 46-51. As a result both Dorszynski and his counsel felt aggrieved at the turn
the proceeding had taken and went to higher courts for redress.
119. 484 F.2d at 850.
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tion.20 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit on July 20, 1973, reversed
the order revoking Dorszynski's probation.' 21
In its affirmance, the Seventh Circuit did take the view that an
adult sentence could be imposed without making any express find-
ing of "no benefit." But considering the overall issues presented, the
point was relatively minor, and it is extremely doubtful that Dor-
szynski himself was really seeking a YCA Zip-6 sentence in prefer-
ence to his adult sentence imposing a ninety-day jail term. 22
Dorszynski's legal position after the Seventh Circuit reversed the
revocation of his probation is not clear. Did Dorszynski's probation
continue to run during the appeal? Probation conditions and bail
conditions are comparable in many respects, and the conditions can
be made co-extensive. If so, a violation of the one will automatically
be a violation of the other. Whether Dorszynski's probation ran
during the appeal is never discussed in the cases. But in light of the
strong possibility that it did, it is difficult to see what Dorszynski's
grievance was at this point. The inference is compelling that he was
only seeking the satisfaction of proving that the district court had
been wrong in its handling of the whole case.
But for whatever reason, Dorszynski petitioned for certiorari and
it was granted on December 10, 1973.'2 On these attenuated facts,
the Supreme Court undertook to decide whether a district court
must make a finding of "no benefit" before it can sentence a youth
offender convicted of a misdemeanor to a regular adult sentence of
not over one year.' 2
On June 26, 1974, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Cir-
cuit and remanded to the district court for further proceedings not
120. Id. at 852. In United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), the Supreme Court upheld
the power of the sentencing judge to take the defendant's false testimony into consideration
in setting a sentence. This holding does not quite reach the question in Dorszynski as to
whether such false testimony can be used to revoke probation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972), indicates that in a probation revocation proceeding a different rule will be applied.
121. 484 F.2d at 852.
122. Id. at 851.
123. 414 U.S. 1091 (1973).
124. Dorszynski was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. The American Civil Liberties
Union filed an amicus curiae brief urging not only that the sentencing judge must make an
express finding of "no benefit" but also must give express reasons for such a finding.
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inconsistent with the opinion. By this time the case was moot, at
least if probation continued to run during the appeal.'25
According to the Seventh Circuit this is what happened after the
remand to the district court:
Upon remand the trial court affirmatively made the express finding
that the defendant would not benefit from treatment under section
5010(b) or (c) of the Youth Corrections Act, but giving as the only
reason for the finding 'the severe nature of his misconduct.' Although
the defendant withdrew his request for a re-sentencing proceeding,
the court concluded that it was obliged to re-sentence and 'the court
sentences' the defendant precisely in the manner in which he was
previously sentenced.'
What all this means is unclear. It may mean that the district court
has only formally entered a new sentence, recognizing at the same
time that Dorszynski had already completed service of the sentence.
It could mean that Dorszynski must still serve the two years proba-
tion, which had been suspended during the appeal. But it also could
mean that because of "perjury" at the motion hearing, the court has
increased the sentence and Dorszynski must serve a new ninety-day
jail term plus two years probation. Whatever the sentence means,
it is also unclear why Dorszynski first asked for resentencing and
then withdrew the request, and whether or not this had any effect
on the court's imposition of the new sentence.
In any event, Dorszynski again appealed to the Seventh Circuit,
re-asserting some of his original grounds, plus new ones, including
one based on the Seventh Circuit's holdings that a youth offender
must be proceeded against by indictment if a YCA confinement
sentence is to be imposed.2 7 Denying retroactive effect to that hold-
ing, the Seventh Circuit on October 15, 1975, affirmed the district
125. Dorszynski was sentenced on February 14, 1972. He was released from confinement
on May 11, 1972. Consequently the two years of probation, if running during the appeal,
ended on May 12, 1974, well before June 26, 1974, the date of the decision. Neither briefs nor
reports of the case give any indication that the mootness point was ever raised.
126. 524 F.2d at 192.
127. United States v. Neve, 492 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1974), adopting the District Court
opinion, 357 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
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court, and on November 10, 1975, denied rehearing and rehearing
en banc. "I
While Dorszynski's position on November 10, 1975 is far from
clear, one thing is quite clear-Dorszynski's use of YCA had no
connection, or at most a very attenuated connection, with the origi-
nal purposes for which the YCA was enacted, or with the question
that the Supreme Court undertook to decide in the Dorszynski case.
If one can attribute motives to Dorszynski and his counsel in light
of this whole sorry episode, the following can be inferred: Dorszynski
thought he had been miserably used-he thought he had a promise
of probation for cooperation with the federal authorities and
pleaded guilty. He got a jail sentence of ninety days instead. He was
angry and decided to fight the government. The sentencing judge
found him to be a troublemaker and thought he had lied, and to
teach him a lesson improperly revoked his probation. Dorszynski's
actions thereafter are hard to understand, except that he became
determined to fight this to the bitter end-at no financial cost to
him, inasmuch as he was proceeding in forma pauperis.
B. Durst v. United States2,
The second case the United States Supreme Court has taken in
order to interpret the YCA is Durst v. United States. When the facts
are considered, one thing is clear-the defendants were not seeking
the "treatment" benefits of the YCA, that is, unless they were all
masochists.
All five youths were convicted of misdemeanors, given probation
under § 5010(a), and as a condition of probation one was fined $50
and the others $100 each. Durst was fined $100 and also required to
make restitution of $160.1o
128. 524 F.2d at 190, 193.
129. 434 U.S. 542 (1978). Five separate cases in the District of Maryland were consolidated.
District court proceedings, which took place in 1976, are not reported. The court of appeals
affirmed without a published opinion. 549 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1976). Certiorari and motion to
proceed in forma pauperis were granted by the Supreme Court on March 21, 1977. 430 U.S.
929. Information given in the reported opinions has been supplemented by use of the briefs.
CRIMINAL LAW SERIES, 9 LAW REPRmS No. 13 (1977-1978 Term).
130. Durst pleaded guilty to a violation of § 1701, obstruction of mails, which carries a
maximum penalty of a $100 fine and six months imprisonment. He was sentenced on Febru-
ary 24, 1976, to six months imprisonment, which sentence was suspended, and was placed
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The question presented to the Supreme Court for decision, as
stated in the opinion of the Court, was "whether a trial judge (or
designated United States Magistrate) who suspends a sentence of
commitment and places a youth offender on probation pursuant to
§ 5010(a) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA), 18 U.S.C. §
5005 et seq. (1976 ed.), may impose a fine, or require restitution, or
both, as conditions of probation."'' 1
The relief asked for by the defendants had nothing to do with the
supposed benefits of the YCA, other than simply being relieved of
paying fines, and in the case of Durst, making restitution. The
petitioners asked that their sentences be vacated and remanded "for
resentencing with directions to strike from each sentence the re-
quirement of payment of the fine and, in the case of Durst, restitu-
tion."'32 If the petitioners had won in the Supreme Court, and the
case had been remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent,
whether the district court would have been so limited is arguable.
Perhaps the court could have imposed a Zip-6 sentence under §
5010(b) on the theory that such treatment was for the benefit of the
defendants, and so would not constitute an increase of sentence in
violation of North Carolina v. Pearce. 133
As regards Durst, it appears the case as to him had become moot
on probation for three years under § 5010(a). As a condition of probation he was fined $100
and ordered to make restitution of $160. On December 22, 1976, after probation was revoked
for an upidentified violation, a "no benefit" finding was made. A regular adult sentence of
three months imprisonment was then imposed. Durst was released from custody on February
26, 1977, no reason being reported for the early release.
Rice, like Durst, pleaded guilty to a violation of § 1701, and on June 2, 1976, was given a
suspended six months jail term, and placed on probation under § 5010(a) fortwo years and
fined $100. He was a young adult, and so sentence was imposed under § 4216.
Blystone pleaded guilty to a violation of § 661, theft of property worth less than $100 from
a government reservation, and on February 24, 1976, was placed on two years probation under
§ 5010(a) and fined $100 as a condition of probation. The sentence apparently made no
reference to a sentence of imprisonment or suspension of the imposition of such a sentence.
The maximum penalty authorized for the offense is a $1,000 fine and a one-year imprison-
ment. Pinnick was convicted of the same offense and on April 5, 1q6, given the same
sentence, and also "was sentenced to a suspended sentence," whatever that means. Brief for
Petitioners p. 3, 434 U.S. 542. Flakes similarly pleaded guilty to a violation of § 641 and on
May 26, 1976, the "imposition of sentence as to imprisonment was suspended" and he was
placed on probation under § 5010(a) for one year and fined $50. Id. at 4:.
131. 434 U.S. at 543.
132. Petitioners' Brief at 12, 434 U.S. 542.
133. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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before the Supreme Court granted certiorari. For undisclosed rea-
sons he had violated probation under § 5010(a), his probation had
been revoked, the court had made a "no benefit" finding, and he
had been given a three-month adult jail term, without any fine or
requirement of restitution. He had served this jail term and been
released. It thus appears that as to him the fine and restitution had
simply been superseded by the adult sentence. 3 '
The Durst argument was that the YCA provides an alternative
sentencing structure for YCA offenders, which is exclusive of the
penalties provided for regular offenders. Inasmuch as the YCA is
silent as to the imposition of fines or restitution, under this view of
the exclusive nature of the YCA, a fine or restitution is unauthorized
in connection with a YCA sentence, at least as to sentences imposed
under § 5010(a) and (b), regardless of what may be authorized under
§ 5010(c). The Supreme Court thought that the legislative history
was to the contrary and showed that Congress intended to continue
to authorize fines in connection with YCA sentences.
The holding of the Supreme Court was that "when placing a
youth offender on probation under § 5010(a), the sentencing judge
may require restitution, and, when the otherwise applicable penalty
provision permits, impose a fine as conditions of probation ... 135
The restitution contention by Durst was abandoned by his counsel
at oral argument.136 The Court thought that both fines and restitu-
tion were "rehabilitative" and not merely punitive and that the
legislative history showed that Congress intended to authorize sent-
encing courts to use these techniques in connection with the use of
probation under § 5010(a). The point is essentially semantic-
134. As to restitution, the Durst brief recognized the mootness point, arguing against
mootness on the ground that if left standing the sentence could have a detrimental conse-
quence in that a future sentencing judge might not, for that reason, consider imposing a fine
or restitution. The reasoning is far-fetched, to say the least, but even more so is the endeavor
to bring the proceeding within the scope of a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Petitioners' Brief at 11, 434 U.S. 542. The government did not respond to this point.
Durst's brief does not discuss the point as to whether his case is not also moot as to the
fine.
135. 434 U.S. at 544.
136. 434 U.S. at 550, n.11. Query whether counsel had anything to abandon. See text
following note 133, supra.
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people dislike "rehabilitative" fines as much as they dislike
"punitive" fines.' 37
VIII. ILLUSORY SEGREGATION AND TREATMENT OF YCA OFFENDER
While the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the YCA
only where misdemeanants were involved, the courts of appeals
have relied on the same cases in applying the YCA to the most
"hardened" of youthful offenders. The saga of Conrad S. Dancy, as
reported, is an extreme example. 138
On September 23, 1971, when Dancy was under the age of twenty-
two 139 and eligible for the YCA, he was convicted of a felony murder,
committed in the District of Columbia in 1970. The conviction was
affirmed. 4 The sentencing judge asked for a § 5010(e) observation
report before imposing sentence. The report recommended an adult
sentence, and accordingly the court imposed the mandatory adult
137. Counsel for Durst overlooked, as did the Supreme Court, a broader argument that can
be made on the use of fines as a condition of probation.
Section 3651 states, "While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defen-
dant-May be required to pay a fine in one or several sums." Durst interprets this as though
there were a period after the word "fine," thus disregarding the significance of the words "in
one or several sums." When a fine is to be paid is not dealt with in any statutory provision;
there is nothing comparable to § 3568, which sets forth an exclusive method for determining
when a sentence of imprisonment commences to run. Section 356E deals only with the
"collection" of fines and penalties.
The Probation Act does not provide an independent basis for imposing a fine. As the Court
said in Durst, "[A] fine may be imposed under § 3651 only if the penalty provision of the
offense under which the youth is convicted so provides." 434 U.S. at 550 (footnote omitted).
The Court left open the question whether a fine can be imposed under § 3651 when the statute
authorizes only a term of imprisonment. Id., n.12.
If this be true, then the purpose of the provision in § 3651 is simply to make the "manner
of payment" of a fine the condition of probation. The court may require payment in a lump
sum and fix the time, the same as when the fine is imposed in conjunction with a term of
imprisonment. Or a fine may be imposed, with payment to be in installments. In either case,
the nonpayment of the fine as required is a violation of the conditioni of probation, and so
grounds for revoking probation. On the other hand, when a fine is imposed as punishment,
without being a condition of probation, there is nothing but a civil remedy for nonpayment.
In this latter case, imprisonment for nonpayment would be an additional punishment and
violate double jeopardy.
138. United States v. Dancy, 489 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (no published opinion), affl'd,
United States v. Dancy, 510 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nom,
Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1978).
139. His exact age is never stated.
140. United States v. Dancy, 489 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (no published opinion).
FEDERAL YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT
sentence of life imprisonment, under which twenty years of service
are required for parole eligibility. An appeal was taken to the court
of appeals, which held the appeal pending Supreme Court action in
Dorszynski. In light of that decision, Dancy's sentence was vacated
and the case remanded for resentencing.'11
On remand, the district court used § 5010(c) to impose a YCA
sentence of twenty years. Under this sentence, instead of having to
serve twenty years before becoming eligible for parole, Dancy be-
came eligible for parole immediately and he had to be released'on
parole after service of eighteen years. Dancy was transferred from
the Lorton Youth Center to the Federal Correctional Institute at
Petersburg; because of misconduct he was then transferred to the
United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, where he was placed in
the general population. He brought a habeas corpus proceeding,
claiming that under the YCA he could not be confined in the general
population of a federal penitentiary. The district court agreed and
ordered him transferred back to Petersburg. The Third Circuit af-
firmed the grant of the writ, but vacated the portion requiring that
Dancy be confined at Petersburg. 1 2 (The FCI at Petersburg is used
as a place of confinement for both YCA and non-YCA offenders.)
In accepting Dancy's argument, the court relied upon the many
cases justifying imposition of a longer YCA -sentence on a misde-
meanant than the sentence authorized for an adult, or for a youth
treated as an adult. 1 3 The court relied heavily on the quid pro quo
argument used by then-Judge Burger in Carter v. United States.44
But inasmuch as no "longer" sentence was involved in Dancy, it was
necessary to turn to a "conditions of confinement" approach to find
the quid pro quo. "[I]f a youth offender serving a YCA sentence is
subject to exactly the same conditions of confinement as an adult
141. United States v. Dancy, 510 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
142. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1978). The Third Circuit had considered the
matter of conditions of confinement of YCA offenders once before. In 1973, in a per curiam
opinion, it remanded United States v. Lowery, 484 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1973), to the district
court for a hearing. Apparently, the problem went away, because Lowery did not come up
again for consideration.
The District of Columbia also considered the same question. United States v. Alsbrook,
336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971); and United States v. Lowery, 335 F. Supp. 519 (D.D.C. 1971).
No final resolution of the question resulted from these cases.
143. See text beginning after note 42, supra.
144. 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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prisoner, the quid pro quo rationale is undermined and the constitu-
tionality of the Act called into question."''
But the Third Circuit became lost in the underbrush when it
undertook to spell out the type of confinement that was permitted
under the YCA.
Dancy argued that the youth offender "must be segregated from
other offenders at all times, and that confining him among adult
prisoners in a federal penitentiary is contrary to the terms of his
sentence.""'4 On the other hand, the governmenf argued that "YCA
inmates need only be segregated from other offenders 'insofar as
practical' . "14... "I Although the court said it accepted Dancy's
construction of the YCA, in a footnote substantially contradicting
the text, the court gave the government most of what it wanted. In
the text of the opinion, the court said, "[P]lacing a youth offender
in the general population of a federal penitentiary is contrary to
[the YCA]."'' But in the supporting footnote this was modified by
saying, "A youth offender may not be placed, as petitioner has, in
the general adult population of a federal penitentiary. But this
would not prevent the establishment of a youth offender facility
within the walls of a penitentiary if it otherwise complied with the
treatment and segregation requirements of the YCA."' 4
The Bureau of Prisons apparently understands this to mean that
the provision of separate sleeping quarters, by using separate hous-
ing facilities, within its regular adult institutions complies with the
"treatment and segregation requirements. of the YCA."' This has
been the response of the Bureau of Prisons to the Dancy decision.' 5'
145. 572 F.2d at 111. In support, the court cited Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975), holding that New York could not constitutionally
confine, under a comparable New York act, YCA offenders with adult offenders. The New
York YCA had been repealed.
146. 572 F.2d at 109.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 113.
149. Id. at 113, n.9.
150. Id.
151. See also Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Wis. 1977), which ordered release
of YCA offenders confined in violation of the YCA. There is no further reported developments
regarding Brown and the case was ignored by the Third Circuit in Dancy.
On April 20, 1979, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, in a suit
filed by nine inmates at Englewood FCI, ruled that defendants committed under the YCA
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Only one judge, and then in lonely dissent, has taken a look at
the operation of the YCA since 1950 as an aid to application of the
Act. This was District Judge James M. Burns of Oregon, sitting by
designation in the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Marron. ' 51
Circuit Judge James M. Carter was also on the panel, Judge Carter
having come to the bench shortly before the YCA was enacted, and
so was familiar with the YCA from its origin.' 53
At issue was the legality of a probation revocation, but this turned
upon the legality of the original sentence. After finding that the
twenty-year old offender would benefit from the YCA, the district
judge had sentenced him to three-years confinement, and then,
using § 3651, suspended execution on condition he spend thirty days
in jail, in 48-hour stints, followed by probation for the balance of the
term.
After apparently having served his time in jail, Marron was con-
victed of a violation of state law, and for this his probation was
revoked and he was committed under a regular Zip-6 sentence.
Speaking for the court, Judge Carter found it unnecessary to de-
termine whether probation had been properly revoked, because he
found the original sentence was illegal and subject to correction by
the imposition of a "legal" Zip-6 sentence. The first sentence he
said, had "amounted to imposition of retributive punishment,
which is not permitted under the YCA." 4
Judge Burns rejected this sterile conclusive reasoning. While he
felt bound by the Ninth Circuit precedents that required holding
the original sentence illegal, he hoped they would be reconsidered
by an en banc court.'55 But he felt free to challenge the disposition
of the case and on this ground dissented. He challenged the view
that the YCA is exclusively a rehabilitative sentence, pointing out,
are entitled to special programs and to be confined separately from other inmates. The
Bureau of Prisons was given until September 1, 1979, to submit a written plan of implementa-
tion and the U.S. Parole Commission was given 30 days to establish parole release dates.
Federal Prison System, Monday Morning Highlights, May 7, 1979, p. 2.
152. 564 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1977).
153. Id. at 871, n.5.
154. Id. at 870. The Ninth Circuit precedents ruled imposition of a fine in connection with
probation under § 5010(a) to be illegal.
155. Id. at 872-74.
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"A better reading of the YCA. . . is to say that any and all penal
objectives may be pursued in sentencing under its provisions, so
long as the means chosen to satisfy these objectives do not substan-
tially detract from the primary goal of rehabilitation.' 5
Then turning his attention to the operation of the YCA he said: As
for rehabilitation, it is extremely doubtful that two of the chosen
means of the Act-§§ 5010(b) and 5010(c)-any longer serve their
purpose, if they ever did. Many, if not most, of the youths committed
to custody under § 5010(b) are in exactly the same institutions, and
under precisely the same conditions, as adults who have been impris-
oned, regardless of whether the principal aim of the sentencing judge
was deterrence, separation, retribution, or rehabilitation. We do not
need scholars to tell us that rehabilitation is an uncommon product
of incarceration in such large fortresses. An imaginatively designed
probation sentence will usually be far more rehabilitative to a young
offender than confinement for possibly four years under § 5010(b) or
eight years under § 5010(c). To say that a fine or a short jail sentence
imposed as condition of probation is punitive and retributive in com-
parison to youth offender commitment which is "rehabilitative,"
strikes me as jurisprudence by label and the height of unrealism
The Hayes line of cases stands for the proposition that up to four
years of total confinement in a federal prison is "rehabilitative," so
long as we order it for a youth under 22 (or for that matter, a young
adult under 26), but a fine or 30 days in jail or a community treat-
ment center as a condition of probation is "punitive." I dare say that
few, if any, of the youths who spend time in Lompoc would agree with
this distinction. I dare say that few of the Bureau of :Prison employees
who keep them there would either. 157
156. Id. at 873.
157. Id. at 873-74 (footnotes omitted). The Hayes line of cases referred to are based on the
precedent, United States v. Hayes, 474 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1973), holding that a fine cannot
be coupled with a Zip-6 sentence.
In footnotes accompanying his opinion, Judge Burns made other telling points. He criti-
cized Judge Carter's intimation that a sentencing judge can accomplish the result of imposing
a short confinement sentence by using the observation provision set forth in § 5010(e) of the
YCA. He also criticized district courts accomplishing the same result by using the split
sentence, after a finding of no benefit, and then using Rule 35 to change the sentence to YCA
under § 5010(a). Such use is to force judges to be "corner cutters."
He also quoted Bureau of Prisons statistics to the effect that 777 pern.ons were confined at
the FCI at Lompoc, of whom 297 had YCA sentences and 480 had adult sentences. Among
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The conclusion to be drawn, of course, from looking at these facts
is that a Zip-6 sentence is a more severe sentence than the one that
Marron had originally received, and so violates the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment.
Given the case as presented, that Marron's sentence could not be
increased by imposing a Zip-6 sentence and the original three-year
sentence was "illegal," Judge Burns concluded that the only valid
disposition would be resentencing to probation under § 5010(a). But
this meant that there could be no penalty imposed after probation
revocation, because it would be illegal and would constitute double
jeopardy to impose the only legal sentence, Zip-6, that could be
imposed. But it is not necessary, as Judge Burns thought, to paint
the sentencing judge into such a corner. By the simple expedient of
changing the "benefit" finding to a "no benefit" finding the way is
cleared to correct the sentence by imposing an adult sentence of
three years, which is subject to a penalty after revocation. After all,
Judge Burns's own analysis of the operation of the YCA, quoted
above, shows that the YCA offender receives "no benefit"'under
YCA confinement.
IX. CONCLUSION
The unanimity of the prestigious sponsors of the YCA-the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, the Executive Department as
represented by the Bureau of Prisons, and the Congress-has mili-
tated against any agency of government making a realistic examina-
tion and appraisal of the actual operation of the YCA by comparing
that operation to the hoped-for expectations stated by its sponsors
at the time of adoption. '58
In Congress, the need for realistic appraisal of the YCA has been
lost in the continuing controversy over revising the whole federal
criminal code, of which repealing of the YCA would be only a part.'59
the latter he thought there must be "hardened offenders" from whom YCAs are supposed to
be segregated.
158. But see Note, The Federal Youth Corrections Act: Past Concern in Need of Legislative
Reappraisal, 11 AM. Cium. L. REv. 229-71 (1972). The reappraisal tends to "out-YCA" the
YCA by calling for legislative changes designed to more effectively carry out the purposes of
the YCA as stated by its sponsors. The writer makes a half-hearted recommendation to
exclude misdemeanants from the YCA.
159. Under S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), YCA would have been repealed by the
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The Department of Justice likewise is more interested in securing
adoption of the whole proposed revision of the criminal code than
in seeking to change only one of its parts.
Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court apparently re-
mains fully conscious of the prominent part played by the judiciary
in the adoption of the YCA. It interprets the YCA only in light of
the noble purposes that motivated the judiciary in the 1940's when
the YCA was promoted. The Court conveniently uses the cloaking
mantle of the judicial process to ignore all consideration of how the
YCA has operated in the real world during the last quarter century.
Both Congress and the Court ignore the fact thaL the YCA does
not carry out the principal purposes sought by its sponsors: segrega-
tion and treatment.
YCA sponsors envisioned that the relatively innocent first of-
fender would be segregated from the contaminating influence of the
older hardened criminal. But this objective can be accomplished
under the YCA only by putting the first offender on probation""
which can also be done under the general Probation Act. Thus, the
YCA adds nothing useful. YCA confinement sentences in fact result
in imprisoning youthful first offenders with hardened crimi-
nals-both youthful and adult.' But even YCA prisoners are not
necessarily young. Those sentenced under the Zip-6 may be over
thirty before completing the sentence, and the YCA youth sent-
enced under § 5010(c) may be an old man before completing service
of his sentence.
The value of separation by age may itself be illusory, and is at
least open to question. There is much to be said for mixing offenders
of different ages, the older offender having a steadying influence on
the young, and the young perhaps having a leavening effect on the
failure to re-enact any comparable provision. The requirement that the proposed Sentencing
Commission consider an offender's age in developing sentencing guidelines was seen as a
satisfactory alternative to accomplishing YCA purposes. § 2302. See S. REP. No. 605, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 930 (1977).
160. Whether or not segregation can in fact be accomplished on probation may also be
questionable.
161. This effort at segregation is bound to be spotty, because of the difficulty-indeed
impossibility-of segregating the youthful offender from so-called hardened offenders from
the time of arrest, through jail, confinement, and to the completion of the sentence.
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older. This very probably is a factor in the Bureau of Prisons having
found it impractical to establish institutions-exclusively for YCA
offenders, and the statute requires segregation only "insofar as
practical.116 2
The "treatment" envisioned by YCA involves "corrective and
preventive guidance and training designed to protect the public by
correcting the anti-social tendencies of youth offenders."163 Neither
the Bureau of Prisons nor anyone else has found any treatment
programs that are of peculiar efficacy for YCA offenders. Programs
that are "good" for YCA offenders are also "good" for offenders of
the same age serving adult sentences, as well as being "good" for
adults as well. To expect to develop special treatment programs for
a special class of offenders is simply wishful thinking.
It is not necessary to take into account the shift in the philosophy
of sentencing that has occurred since 1950-the shift from rehabili-
tation to just desserts-to conclude that the YCA has failed. Even
under a rehabilitative theory, the YCA is a failure.
X. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. YCA Should Be Repealed, Except as Noted Below
Proposals deriving from the report of the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (the Brown Commission) have




164. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971)
authorized the sentencing judge to recommend that offenders under the age of 22 be "confined
and treated in facilities ... for the rehabilitation of youth offenders." See 18 U.S.C. § 3203(c)
(1976), Id. at 291. But it is unclear in the report whether outright repeal of the YCA was being
recommended or only re-enactment as a separate chapter. The comment to § 3203 is sugges-
tive of repeal, but the Table of Disposition of Title 18 provisions refers only to § 5010(e). Id.
at 483.
Under S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), YCA would have been repealed and no separate
provision relating to youthful offenders included. See § 2001. The same is true of S. 1437,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See § 2001.
The Report of the Judicial Committee on S. 1437 simply noted the change and commented
that in formulating guidelines, the Sentencing Commission would be required to take age into
consideration. Supra note 159.
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. The Bureau of Prisons, which is responsible for administration of
the YCA, likes to quote th4 inspirational words of the sponsors of
the YCA. It then calls for outright repeal of the YCA..' 5 The Bureau
is chary in its criticisms of the YCA, lest it perhaps be charged with
the impropriety of indirectly criticizing the judges who in judicial
proceedings have found the Bureau's administration of the YCA to
be wanting.
The New York Youth Corrections Act, considered by the Judicial
Conference to be a progressive model for the federal YCA'55 was
repealed by New York in 1974,167 on the recommendation of the New
York Department of Corrections, and for the same reasons that
support the repeal of the federal YCA.55
With the repeal of the YCA, another "Noble Experiment" can be
brought to a merciful end.
B. More Favorable Parole Guidelines for YCA Offenders Should
Be Continued
If the YCA is repealed, any statutory basis for the United States
Parole Commission applying different guidelines to YCA offenders
than to adults will be eliminated.
On the assumption that the Parole Commission does have a basis
for using different guidelines for YCA and adult offenders, other
than giving the appearance that it is carrying out a mandate of
Congress, the distinction should be preserved. This can easily be
done by adding an amendment to Chapter 311 of the Code requiring
the Commission to use different guidelines for offenders under the
165. In testimony before the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, Norman A. Carlson, on
October 27, 1978, said:
While the Youth Corrections Act was a landmark at the time of its passage, we believe
that experience and changes which have taken place over the years have caused the
act to outlive its usefulness. We support those provisions of the proposed legislation
to revise the Federal Criminal Code which would eliminate the Youth Corrections Act.
In our opinion, sentences for youthful offenders should not be longer than those given
older individuals who commit similar offenses.
Federal Prisons System, Monday Morning Highlights, October 13, 1978, p. 2.
166. Note 13 supra.
167. 1974 N.Y. Laws, ch. 652, § 7.
168. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1118-19 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975).
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age of 22, or perhaps 26, at the time of conviction, than for adults.
While this would bring within the YCA guidelines those youthful
offenders serving adult sentences, the power of the Commission to
go outside the guidelines in granting or denying parole gives the
Commission the discretion to handle these cases.'69
C. An Expungement Provision Should Be Retained
Congress should re-examine the expungement provision con-
tained in § 5021 with a view to making it more effective. Until a
broad expungement statute is developed it is easy to retain what-
ever benefit the present provision has by making it applicable to
offenders who were under 22, or perhaps 26, at the time of convic-
tion. The power to trigger the expungement could be left as it is,
with the sentencing judge when probation is granted and with the
Parole Commission on confinement sentences, or the entire author-
ity could be given to the sentencing judge.
D. Retroactive Application of Repeal of YCA
With repeal of the YCA, all YCA offenders should be entitled,
upon application to the sentencing court, to have their YCA sent-
ences changed to regular sentences under § 4205(b)(2), with maxi-
mum terms no greater than the term of the YCA sentence or the
term authorized for the offense, whichever is the lesser. Whether or
not the sentencing judge views the change as beneficial to the appli-
cant should be irrelevant, as long as the change asked for is one
authorized by statute. Whether or not subsequent events prove the
choice to have been wise or unwise should be a matter solely for the
consideration of the applicant.
169. Congress might also want to consider requiring the Commission to use these different
YCA guidelines for granting parole to adults serving § 4205(b) sentences. Not everyone pres-
ently thinks that the Parole Commission is carrying out the intent of Congress in treating all
adult sentences alike.
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